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1Abstract
Organizational Sources of Technological Designs in the Microprocessor Market
This research investigates the organizational sources of technological variation in
industry. The specific focus is on the introduction of new technical designs in the
microprocessor market. Using data on all merchant producers of microprocessors from 1971
to 1989, I find that the source of most new design introductions is new entrants rather than
existing firms in the market. I also find that the rate at which sponsors (the original
producers and innovators) of these designs enter the market follows the pattern predicted by
organizational ecology's density-dependent model (Hannan, 1986). Consistent with the
economic literature on standards (See David and Greenstein, 1990), the greater the number
of imitators of these original designs, the lower is sponsor entry. Finally, contrary to the
predictions of the dominant design model (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), but consistent with
resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985), the emergence of a dominant technological
community spurs rather than hinders the entry of sponsors of new designs. In general, the
findings suggest that the models and theories developed by organizational ecologists provide
a useful framework for analyzing the technological evolution of an industry.

2Organizational Sources of Technological Designs in the Microprocessor Market
What are the organizational sources of technological variation in industry? While
studies have documented the effects of technological change on mortality (Barnett, 1990),
organizational performance (Teece, 1988) and industry structure (Pavitt, 1984), little research
has investigated the sources of technological variation. In essence, current views in the
literature generally see technology as arising outside of organizational processes, with its
sources either undetermined or assumed to be random.
Currently, an influential model of technological change is the dominant design theory
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The dominant design
theory (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) posits that technological change occurs through an
evolutionary pattern of variation, selection and retention. Variation is provided by
technological breakthroughs or discontinuities, which occur stochastically and randomly.
Following the discontinuity, a selection process occurs, highlighted by a period of intense
competition between the old and new technical regime and within the new technical order.
According to the theory, this period of ferment and experimentation ends with a watershed
event, the emergence and retention of a dominant design (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). A
dominant design is a single architecture that comes to dominate a product class (Sahal, 1981,
Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Once this design emerges, future technological change is
confined to incremental change that elaborates this basic design until the next discontinuity
restarts the cycle.
Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992, p. 3 12) have noted that, "technological evolution is
driven by a combination of technical, economic, social, political, and organizational
processes and, as such, deserves more sustained attention from organizational scholars."
While the dominant design theory underscores the importance of social and organizational
processes in the selection and retention portion of the model, it neglects these factors with
3respect to technological variation. For instance, in the model, technological discontinuities,
which are posited to be the sources of variation, occur randomly and unpredictably, like
bolts out of the blue. Perhaps this conception of variation is unnecessarily narrow.
Alternatively, we might conceive of variation as occurring when new designs are introduced,
regardless of whether a design is a technological discontinuity.
New designs, and the economic, social and organizational processes that support
their introduction, deserve greater attention. In many industries technological change
involves a competition between competing designs, each of which is supported by a
community of organizations. A design's supporters often include a sponsor (a firm that has a
proprietary interest in the design), a group of firms that copy the design, and various firms
that produce associated components. Importantly, technological change occurs incrementally
within each design. While newer products using a previously established design become
more technologically advanced, they share technical compatibility with earlier products. So
technological change within a design follows a technological trajectory, just as does
technological evolution within an industry (Sahal, 1985). For instance, while the computing
capacity and speed of IBM's personal computer has increased phenomenally since its
introduction in 1981, it still embodies the same basic design. Each new more advanced
personal computer, while technologically superior to previous products, is downwardly
compatible.
A dominant design serves as a technological guidepost which charts the direction of
future technological progress in an industry (Sahal, 1981). Attention to the competitive
dynamics between designs reminds us, however, that competing designs in a market each
represent potential technological trajectories for an industry, and are thus sources of
technological variation. Because variation is the raw material upon which selection and
retention operate, determining its source is a key theoretical issue. At this point, it should
be clear that this conceptualization of technological change is not necessarily inconsistent
with the general precepts of the dominant design theory, but simply a modification of one
component, that of technological variation.
In this study, I view designs as constituting technological variation and attempt to
discover the organizational and community level processes that govern its sources and
emergence. The initial purpose of this study is to learn whether new or old firms are the
primary source of technological variation. Then rates at which new firms enter the market
with new designs and the rate at which existing firms in the market introduce subsequent
designs will be explored. Finally, I hope to show that a community level framework based
on theories developed by organizational ecologists can yield insight into these processes. (See
Barnett and Carroll (1987), and Brittain and Wholey (1988) for examples of this approach.)
In so doing, I contrast ecological predictions with existing models of technological change,
including the economics of standards literature (David and Greenstein, 1990) and the
dominant design model (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). In
some cases these literatures can be integrated, while in others, competing predictions are
generated.
To explore these issues surrounding technological variation, I investigate the
microprocessor market from its inception in 1971 to 1989. During this period, many
alternative designs competed for dominance in the market, and each design was often
supported by multiple organizations. Because of its rapid rate of technological change and
the interplay between these competing communities supporting alternative designs, this
market is ideal for examining how interdependencies between firms and communities shape
technological variation. I begin by providing a brief history and description of the
microprocessor market.
5The Microprocessor Market
The origin of the microprocessor market can be traced to Ted Hoff of Intel, who had
been assigned the task of designing the chips for a new multi-function calculator for
Busicom, a small Japanese calculator company. At this time, each function on a calculator
was performed by a logic chip specially designed for that task. Thus, each new function,
such as exponentiation, which was added to the calculator required another chip. As the
number of functions climbed, coordinating and designing these chips became a daunting task.
Hoff thought it might be more efficient if Intel designed a single chip with an instruction set
that could be programmed to perform all of the functions needed. The result was the 4004
which was introduced in 1971. Intel successfully negotiated with Busicom for the right to
market this chip in other areas. Busicom eventually faded from the scene and failed, while
Intel started a new industry which it dominates to this day. In the early seventies, quarterly
sales in the microprocessor market were only several million; since then, sales have grown
tremendously, to almost 600 million per quarter by the third quarter of 1989 1 .
Firms in the microprocessor market generally pursue one of two strategies. First, a
firm can design and produce an original microprocessor. A firm that produces one or
more original designs can be thought of as a sponsor. In the economics literature, a
sponsor is an organization that holds a proprietary interest in a technology or design (David
and Greenstein, 1990). By virtue of holding the rights to the central product of a design
family, this firm is the sponsor of the design. A design is defined as a family of
microprocessors and peripheral products that share some degree of technical
compatibility. Firms that produce an original design are often referred to by industry
observers as primary sources. Essentially, firms that follow this strategy are innovators.
Although the three terms, sponsor, primary source and innovator are essentially equivalent,
sponsor is used throughout this paper because of its more precise theoretical meaning. In
6this industry, a prominent sponsor is Intel, the original designer of the family of
microprocessors used in the IBM personal computer. Intel has also produced other designs
completely incompatible with the processors used in the personal computer. For instance, in
1981, Intel introduced the IAPX432, a 32 bit microprocessor, which was unsuccessful and
had faded from the scene by 1984.
A second strategy is to copy an existing product, in which case, the firm becomes
known as a second source. Because patent protection in the semiconductor industry is
relatively weak, these second sources are not always authorized. Often, a sponsor contacts a
second source after the firm is already producing one of the sponsor's designs and receives a
nominal licensing fee (Swann, 1987). Although this phenomenon of followership or
imitation is common in other markets, there is really no precise theoretical term that has
been consistently used to describe firms that follow this strategy. For purposes of clarity,
firms pursuing this strategy shall be referred to hereafter as second sources. A leading
second source in the market who copies many of Intel's products is Advanced Micro Devices
(AMD).
After introducing an initial microprocessor design, sponsors often introduce
subsequent products that elaborate and improve upon the initial design. Thus, Intel's 8086,
which is software compatible with its earlier 8085, can be considered an extension of that
same basic design. The introduction of a new design can be conceptualized as the beginning
of a new technological paradigm (Dosi, 1982). The basic design imposes a way of doing
things, thereby defining a trajectory that will be followed by future products in that design.
As defined by Dosi (1982), a technological paradigm defines the needs that are to be
fulfilled, the scientific principles to be used for a task, and the technology to be employed.
One factor that commonly places products in the same technological paradigm is simple
operational compatibility. In any given technical market, several basic designs often exist;
7each embodies a technological paradigm and is supported by a community of organizations.
Accordingly, organizational communities can be defined by grouping products that have some
degree of hardware and software compatibility. Essentially, these products are associated
with a common design.
Using this approach, a community based on a technological paradigm or design
consists of the sponsor of the design, and all of the second sources that copy any of the
products associated with that design2 . This definition of a community is closely tied to the
economic literature on technical standardization (David and Greenstein, 1990). Because
products within a community are compatible, each community and its associated design
represents a potential technical standard for the industry3 . It should be clear that this
conceptualization of a community means that it is possible for a firm to be a member of
more than one community. Thus, a firm that sponsors two different and thus incompatible
designs would be in two communities. Similarly, a second source that copies two different
designs would also be in two communities. For instance, Zilog sponsors two different
designs, the Z80 and the Z8000. Sharp, a second source copies both of these designs. In
communities defined at the level of the design, Sharp and Zilog would be members of two
distinct communities.
An alternative definition of community is based solely on sponsorship. Using this
approach, a microprocessor community consists of the sponsor and all those second
sources that copy its products. Here, rather than focussing purely on technical
compatibility, socioeconomic ties between a sponsor and its second sources form the
community regardless of the number of different designs that the sponsor has produced.
Thus, in a community defined at the level of the sponsor, Sharp and Zilog would just be in a
single community.
Defining a community by sponsorship rather than by technical compatibility does not
8necessarily make the standards literature less relevant. Most literature on standards is based
on the notion of increasing returns. Increasing returns in the form of network externalities
occur when the utility that a user derives from a good increases with the number of other
users of the good. For example, in the case of telephones, it is obvious that as the number
of telephones increases, so does a telephone's value to a given user; the user can speak to
more people on the telephone. This phenomenon occurs in microprocessors and computer
systems because the size of the system affects other firms' decisions to design compatible
peripheral products and software. Increasing returns may also apply at the level of the
sponsor, regardless of the number of designs that the sponsor supports. Sponsorship is akin
to reference or minimum quality standards, which provide signals that a given product
conforms to the content and level of certain defined characteristics (David and Greenstein,
1990). In the same way, the number of second sources centered around a sponsor may send
a signal to customers regarding the reliability and level of support that all of the sponsor's
designs enjoy. That is, the state of a sponsor's total level of support may influence
customers' expectations for the future across all of the sponsor's designs. In effect, the state
of a sponsor's network may be a proxy for its reputation and be the source of positive
feedbacks. For instance, after controlling for compatibility in products, Teece (1988) found
that reputation (as measured by a firm dummy variable) explained over 20% of the variance
in market share in the minicomputer industry.
The idea that reputation and social ties may transcend purely economic issues such as
technical compatibility is closely tied to Granovetter's (1985) notion of embeddedness.
Granovetter (1985) suggested that the evolution of social ties between people and
organizations can have a large influence on economic activity. Sponsor communities may
each have customers who are accustomed to dealing with its processors and employees and
value those relations beyond just judging the technical characteristics of the product. In
9addition, if a firm sponsors more than one design, second sources of one of its designs may
serve as a pool of probable imitators of another because of their previous relationship with
the sponsor. This closure of the social network should maintain and intensify the boundaries
between these communities.
Because it is unclear theoretically whether communities should be defined at the level
of the sponsor or at the level of the design, the hypotheses will be tested using both
definitions of a community. However, from the sociological perspective taken here, a
community defined at the level of the sponsor is the most relevant level of analysis.
Customers and employees of a particular sponsor are liable to develop general relationships
and interdependencies with the sponsor that transcend issues of product compatibility.
Moreover, the fates of designs that originate from the same sponsor are not likely to be
independent. In short, embeddedness considerations are likely to apply (Granovetter, 1985).
Figure 1 shows the number of designs and sponsors in the microprocessor market from 1971
to 19894 .
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
It should be clear that with either definition of community, second sources can be
included in more than one community by copying more than one sponsor's products or by
copying more than one design. Similarly, a sponsor could possibly be a second source for
another sponsor's design. For instance, at one time, National Semiconductor produced its
own original design and copied one of Intel's designs. This might occur because of
uncertainty on the part of the second source or sponsor on which set of products is going to
dominate the industry. If one considers a sponsor and its second sources to constitute an
organizational community, then the average number of communities that a firm belongs to
over the period (per year) is only 1.19. In June of 1989 this number was 1.39. Thus,
while membership in more than one community does occur, firms are only rarely in more
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than two and the mode is one. This finding is important because if each firm was in many
different communities, it would suggest that boundaries between communities were extremely
permeable and thereby call into question the community construct.
Organizational Sources of Technological Variation
An important source of technological variation is the proliferation of new designs,
each of which represents a potential technological trajectory for an industry. There are two
possible sources of new designs: (1) those that originate from new sponsors; and (2) those
that originate from firms that have previously introduced a design (sponsors of earlier
designs). That is, once a firm has pioneered a design, it can stick to elaborations of that
design or it can introduce new designs. Which course of action is most prevalent and the
rate at which each occurs provides insight into the organizational sources of technological
variation.
Prior research on technological innovation suggests that both sources of new designs
may be important. On the one hand, numerous attempts have been made to tie rates of
innovation to firm structural characteristics such as size and decentralization (Hage and
Aiken, 1969; Schumpeter, 1934, 1950). On the other hand, other researchers have
emphasized market and environmental characteristics as driving the innovation process
(Mansfield et al., 1971; Scherer, 1980). In particular, Schmookler (1966) suggested that
economic demand and growth drive innovation. In the first case, firm level characteristics
are thought to be primary, while in the second, the environment becomes preeminent.
The tension between firm level and environmental explanations of technological
progress has many parallels in the debate on organizational change. At one extreme, so-
called contingency theorists have suggested that organizations adapt and change to fit the
demands of the environment (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1967). According to this view,
changes in the environment, such as uncertainty and volatility, trigger organizational change
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and adaptation.
A competing perspective, offered by organizational ecology, suggests that
organizational change is not as effortless as these theories would suggest (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977, 1984). Advocates of this approach point to both internal and external forces
that impede change in organizations. Internal pressures include earlier sunk costs in plants,
equipment, and specialized personnel, constraints on information and internal politics.
External pressures include legitimacy constraints and previous relations with suppliers and
customers. Organizational change may violate these parties' expectations and thus lead to a
loss of legitimacy. Accordingly, this perspective argues that change and variation in
organizational populations occur primarily through selection processes. Firms are limited in
their abilities to change and are selected out if their characteristics cease to fit environmental
constraints. Change occurs through the founding of new organizations and the failure of
established organizations.
On the face of it, the ecological perspective seems to suggest that technological
advancement should only occur through the birth of new firms and the death of older, inertial
firms with the more inefficient technology. Obviously, this extreme view is not valid.
Firms constantly update and improve their technology. One possible way to deal with this
phenomenon would be to divide technological change into that which enhances existing firm
competencies and that which destroys it. For example, in examining technological
discontinuities that result in orders-of-magnitude improvements in performance, Tushman and
Anderson (1986) found that existing firms introduced competence-enhancing discontinuities,
while firms new to the industry pioneered competence-destroying ones. Existing firms were
unlikely to introduce competence-destroying innovations because, unlike competence-
enhancing innovations, they do not build on firms' current skills and competencies.
Tushman and Anderson (1986) studied discontinuous technological change, but
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perhaps the phenomenon is more general. The sheer incompatibility of different designs may
be competence destroying from the perspective of a sponsoring firm. Once a firm creates an
original design, its energies might then focus on producing improved versions that are, at
least to some extent, downwardly compatible with each earlier product. Failure to do so
could alienate customers who have irretrievable investments in the existing architecture and
damage the firm's reputation.
Producing an entirely new design also presumably requires the acquisition of more
new knowledge than an upgrade of an existing design. By doing so, the firm would be
essentially throwing away much of the benefits of prior knowledge. Consequently, pursuing
such a strategy is likely to yield lower returns than building on an existing design. In a
different setting, Haveman (1992) speculated that unrelated firm diversification was
competence-destroying because it did not build on existing firm competencies and routines.
Consistent with her expectations, she found that unrelated diversification was detrimental to
firm performance, while related diversification increased performance.
Thus, once a firm sponsors a design, it may be bound to that design by networks of
suppliers, second sources, and the expectations of customers who have invested in the
design. Further, upgrading an existing design will take advantage of the firm's existing base
of knowledge and possibly lead to higher performance. Of course, firms new to the industry
will have no such constraints.
These observations suggest a parallel between organizational ecology and innovation.
Namely, a change that involves the introduction of a new design may be fundamentally
different from a change that elaborates an existing design. A firm's knowledge and skill in
one design is likely to be very difficult to transfer to a new, incompatible design. In short,
introducing a new design destroys firm competencies, while upgrading an existing design
builds on them. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
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HI: The average number of new designs introduced each year by sponsors who have not
previously introduced an original design will be greater than the average number introduced
by sponsors who already have introduced an original design.
Design Introductions by Existing Firms
Although I speculated that sponsors who introduce a design will tend to elaborate and
improve on an initial design instead of introducing an entirely new one, this rule has
exceptions. For example, in 1986 IBM introduced its OS/2 operating system for personal
computers. The OS/2 system was almost completely incompatible with IBM's old DOS
operating system. Such occurrences raise the question of when will firms depart from their
established trajectories and introduce new designs?
At first glance, few compelling reasons seem to exist to justify a firm's introduction
of a new, incompatible design. By improving an existing design, a firm can take advantage
of its previous experience and knowledge. Customers who have investments in the older
design will probably be less than enthusiastic about embracing a new incompatible design.
Thus, dominant players in a market who have large base of customers at stake would seem
unlikely to introduce a new design, suggesting that most new designs are likely to be put
forward by sponsors having only limited success with their present design.
On the other hand, the ability to innovate is also dependent on a firm's ability to
appropriate the returns from its innovation (Teece, 1987). A sponsor whose community is
enjoying only limited success may be unlikely to have the resources to invest in a new
design. A firm whose products dominate the market is also likely to be the one facing the
greatest competition. For example, in a study of telephone companies, Barnett (1990) found
that the dominant network actually had higher mortality rates throughout much of the
population's history. In a similar vein, Schoonhoven et al. (1990) discovered that firms
under the greatest competitive pressure brought their first products to market more quickly.
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In this market, the sponsor of a successful design is likely to attract intense competition from
second sources attempting to capitalize on the design's large base of users. Thus, a sponsor
in a dominant community may be the most likely to introduce a new design in an effort to
escape severe competitive pressure from second sources.
A previous design's success may also increase the probability that subsequent designs
will be profitable. Although the new design is incompatible, the firm's reputation may aid in
popularizing the new design. For instance, Granovetter (1985) suggests that social ties can
be important to economic outcomes. Thus, ties between the sponsoring firm, its customers
and suppliers may continue to exist even when the product is a new incompatible design.
Old customers and suppliers may value their relationship with the firm and still be unlikely to
switch to a competing firm's product after the introduction of the new incompatible design by
the sponsor. Additionally, it may take second sources of the old design longer to copy the
new design because their prior experience is of less value.
Of course, reputation effects do not guarantee economic success. For example, when
IBM introduced the OS/2 system, the company was under severe competitive pressure from
second sources of its personal computers. Since the new OS/2 system would have been
proprietary, its success would have lessened the competitive threat. However, the inertia of
the installed base of the old system could not be overcome and the OS/2 operating system
was not successful5 . Nonetheless, the timing of the new design introduction was consistent
with the argument suggesting that communities whose products dominate the market are the
most likely sources of new, incompatible designs. Although smaller, more unsuccessful
communities may also be under heavy competitive pressure, the participating firms are
unlikely to have the resources necessary. This assertion is consistent with Schumpeter's
arguments (1950) that large firms will tend to be the primary sources of radical innovation
because only they have the resources to invest in innovation and the market power to profit
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from it. The following hypothesis is suggested:
H2: The more dominant a community, the higher is the probability that the sponsor will
introduce a new design.
Entry Rates of Sponsors
When will firms that have not previously introduced an original design will be most
likely to enter the market? If, as was suggested in Hypothesis 1, this is the most common
way that designs originate, understanding the conditions that determine the entry rate of
sponsors is important because it is the most important source of technological variation. The
characteristics of the existing communities, such as their number and the sheer number of
second sources supporting them should influence this entry rate.
One factor that is likely to influence the rate of sponsor entry is the number of
communities in the market. According to Anderson and Tushman (1990), the era of ferment
following a technological discontinuity is characterized by a high degree of competition
within the technical order between rival approaches or standards. If true, this argument
suggests that the rate of entry of sponsors should be negatively related to the number of other
communities already in the market. In support of this view, Barnett (1990) found in the
telephone industry that the fragmentation of the industry by many incompatible standards
increased the mortality rate for all firms. The density dependent theory of organizational
evolution (Hannan, 1986), however, suggests a different pattern.
Hannan theorized that as a market first develops, an increased number of firms
entering the market encourages further entry. As new firms enter the market, barriers to the
capital market fall, and entrepreneurs begin to see the market as viable. As the number of
firms continues to increase, legitimacy gains diminish as the market achieves a taken-for-
granted status. At this point, no further returns to expansion in numbers occur, only
competition. In a sense, with increasing numbers of firms legitimacy grows at a decreasing
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rate, while competition grows at an increasing rate. More specifically, with regard to
founding rates, the model predicts that at low levels of density (number of organizations),
legitimation processes dominate, causing founding rates to rise. In contrast, at high levels of
density competition dominates and founding rates fall. Support for the model has been found
in populations of newspapers (Carroll and Hannan, 1989), labor unions (Hannan and
Freeman, 1989), telephone companies (Barnett and Carroll, 1987), brewing companies
(Carroll and Swaminathan, 1991; Carroll and Wade, 1991), business interest associations
(Aldrich et al., 1990), and health maintenance organizations (Wholey et aL, 1990).
This same process might apply to the entry rate of sponsors into the market. Early
on, when there are few alternative variations of a technology (e.g. few technological
communities) customers and suppliers may be less likely to invest in the technology because
they are uncertain that it will survive. Similarly, potential sponsors may be fearful of
investing the resources needed to create a new design using an unproven technology. As
more alternative sources of the technology arise, however, customers and potential sponsors
are likely to have increased confidence in the viability of the technology. At this point, the
technology gains legitimacy, and the entry rate of sponsors would be expected to rise. This
legitimation process may be particularly important for systemic technologies like
microprocessors that require compatible associated components (in this case memory and
input output devices) to function. In this case, if the technology perishes, customers lose not
only their investments in the primary product, the microprocessor, but also in a wide range
of other associated products. As density continues to rise, however, the technology becomes
taken for granted and there are no further legitimation gains. Competition overwhelms the
legitimation effect and the entry rate falls. The following hypothesis is implied:
H3: The rate of sponsor entry will at first increase with the number of technological
communities because of legitimation effects. However, as density increases further, the rate
of entry will fall as competition dominates.
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The rate at which sponsors enter the market is likely to be affected not only by the
number of other communities in the market, but also by the sheer number of firms
supporting these communities. Gallini (1984) has suggested that licensing out one's
technology may act as a barrier to prospective entrants with incompatible competing
products. The general idea is that a large number of organizations supporting a design make
it more costly for prospective entrants with a competing but incompatible design to enter the
market because of the large installed base that would have to be overcome. A large number
of second sources implies the likely existence of many supporting products (which make the
community more attractive to customers). The following hypothesis is offered:
H4: The greater the number of second sources supporting existing communities the lower
will be the entry rate of sponsors into the market.
Many authors characterize technological change as a battle to become the dominant
design (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback and Kim, 1986). The emergence of a
dominant design is described as a watershed event in a population's history. After the
emergence of a dominant design, technical uncertainty decreases in a product class,
economies of scale kick in, and many incremental innovations that elaborate and extend the
dominant design drive subsequent technological progress (Myers and Marquis, 1969;
Hollander, 1965; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Almost by definition, this process implies
that as one or a few designs become increasingly dominant, the entry rate of sponsors should
fall. Essentially, as a single community comes to dominate, vendors and customers should
rally around its design. To the extent that one community is dominant, the entry rate of new
potential sponsors should be curtailed. Anderson and Tushman (1990) have identified this
point as when one design captures over 50% of the market. The following hypothesis is
suggested:
H5: After the emergence of a "dominant community," the entry rate of sponsors will decline.
The resource-partitioning model of organizational ecology suggests an opposing
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prediction, namely, that the emergence of a dominant design may spur new firms to sponsor
original designs. Carroll (1985) suggests that when a market is crowded early on,
participants vie for the widest possible resource base. However, later when scale economies
dominate, the surviving generalists move toward the center of the market. This crowding of
the generalists opens pockets of resources at the periphery where specialists can thrive.
Interestingly, one impact of the emergence of a dominant design is that it makes economies
of scale an important competitive factor. So, the emergence of a dominant design or,
correspondingly, an increase in concentration might lead to an increase in the number of
sponsors whose designs cater to specialist applications.
Another related reason that increasing concentration may lead to a resurgence in entry
is that existing communities will increasingly be tied to their existing base of users. Because
of their sunk costs, old users have a stake in these communities and will influence how the
technological direction taken by a "dominant" community will progress. New users, because
they have no sunk investments in a design may have different preferences. These new
customers, who are not locked into the older designs, might want products with different
characteristics that producers of existing designs cannot provide because of their
commitments to their older customers.
At first glance, this argument seems inconsistent with Hypothesis 2 which suggests
that a dominant community will be most likely to introduce subsequent designs. However,
while a dominant community may be more likely than smaller communities to introduce a
second design, Hypothesis 1 contends that the most frequent source of new designs will be
new sponsors. Thus, the introduction of new designs by a dominant community may be too
rare to satisfy new potential users' preferences. The above arguments suggest the following
hypotheses:
H6: The emergence of a dominant community will result in an increase in the rate of entry
of sponsors.
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H7: When scale economies become important as in following the emergence of a dominant
design, increased concentration should lead to the increased entry of sponsors. Furthermore,
these new entrants should tend to serve specialized markets.
Data and Methods
Data on the timing of each firm's participation in the microprocessor market was
obtained from IC Master and a leading data research firm in the industry6 . IC Master, an
annual publication used by engineers to choose integrated circuits that meet their performance
needs, has been published since 1975. Before 1983, IC Master included not only
performance data on a device, but also the date that the product was first shipped. From
1983 onward, this date could be inferred from the years that a firm's devices were included
in the volume. To appear in IC Master, a firm had to be shipping its products in the U.S.
This created a problem since the date needed was the earliest date that a firm shipped
anywhere in the world. However, the quarterly dates given before 1982 appeared to be
worldwide dates. Although this date was not provided after 1982, the market was essentially
globalized by this time. In addition, using multiple sources made it unlikely that an incorrect
date would be used. Finally, the fact that the U.S. was the center of this market made it
likely that most firms began shipping their products in the United States. Entries were
defined as occurring when a firm first put a product into production; exits were recorded
when shipping ceased.
The data research firm analyzes and collects data on the microprocessor market and
sells this information to firms in the industry. Its data includes unit sales by device, by firm,
by quarter. This data was collected by surveying companies in the industry and extends from
1975 through 1989. The research firm's data is worldwide and its accuracy is aided by the
fact that it has offices throughout the world, including Japan and Europe.
Secondary sources used to resolve inconsistencies in the two primary sources included
F&S Indexes, EDN's Annual Microprocessor Survey (1974-1989), Electronics (various
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years), Microprocessors and Microsystems, as well as various published historical accounts
of the industry. By combining the two primary sources, it was possible to construct a fairly
exhaustive and complete list of the products in the industry and the timing of entry and exit.
Multiple sources made it possible to "triangulate" on the date of entry and lowered the
probability that an incorrect date would be used.
Usually, entry and exit dates were calculated to the quarter. In the few cases where
only a yearly entry or exit date was available, the event was randomly assigned to a quarter
during the year. For the 30 communities defined at the level of the sponsor, three entry
dates and seven exit dates could only be determined to the nearest year and were randomly
assigned to quarters within the year. For more details on how these dates were determined,
see Appendix C.
Variables
Population Density Measures: Density is operationalized as the number of firms operating in
the specified domain at a particular point in time. For example, community density consists
of the number of communities in the market; second source density is the number of second
sources supporting these communities. These measures were derived from data on firms'
dates of participation in the industry.
Microprocessor Sales: I obtained yearly product prices from 1974 to 1989 from EDN's
Annual Survey of Microprocessors. Since this issue was published in November, the prices
were assumed to be for the fourth quarter of each year. These prices were interpolated
assuming a constant growth rate to obtain estimated quarterly prices. Since EDN gave prices
for several variations and different quantities of the product, the price for the basic model
was used in the highest quantity given. Since many customers would purchase in high
volumes, this was felt to be the most reasonable price.
If a "basic" model could not be identified, the lowest price given was used. An
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expert at a leading microprocessor firm suggested this procedure, noting that, generally, the
actual prices are usually at the lower end of the advertised prices7
. These prices were then
multiplied by quarterly unit shipment data for the products provided by the data research firm
to obtain sales measures for each product from 1975 through 19898 . From this, a total sales
measure for the industry and for the individual communities was constructed.
Unfortunately, unit sales information from the data research firm only covered 20 of
the 30 communities. Upon closer examination, it appeared that nearly all of the excluded
communities tended to be extremely small. Besides unit data, the research firm also
published microcomponent sales data for firms in the industry. Microcomponents includes
microprocessors, microcontrollers and peripheral devices. In this data the research firm
estimated the total microcomponent sales of firms not included in their survey. This number
ranged from under 1 percent to 3 percent with an average of 1.25 percent9 .
Because the microprocessor sales figures that I computed were partially derived from
the research firm's unit data, this average percentage is probably a good estimate for the
missing communities' share of the total microprocessor sales. In fact, this percentage
probably represents an upper bound since microprocessors are the most visible of the three
markets. Thus, the initial estimated microprocessor sales were assumed to make up 98.75%
of the actual sales. The remaining 1.25% was split equally among the missing communities
each quarter. Although these estimates are crude, more complicated variations are not likely
to affect the results because these sales are low compared to the sales of the other larger
firms and communities. In short, the variation in sales between the firms with missing sales
data was extremely small compared with the sales of the industry. The overall
microprocessor sales estimated here were compared to yearly sales figures that the research
firm published from 1979 to 1989; the correlation was over .99.
I adjusted all figures by the average yearly manufacturing price index for the
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semiconductor industry. In several cases, only a monthly value could be found, and this
value was used in lieu of the annual adjustment figure. Quarterly sales figures were
constructed from 1975 to 1989 for each community. Microprocessor sales were not available
before 1975. However, overall sales of microcomponents which included microprocessors,
microcontrollers and peripheral devices was available back to 1974. A quarterly growth rate
was selected so that interpolating backwards from the mean quarterly microprocessor sales in
1975 yielded an annual growth rate equal to the annual growth rate of microcomponents
between 1975 and 1974. This growth rate was then used to interpolate back to 1971.
Concentration: Two measures of concentration and inequality were computed at the
community level, the Herfindahl Index, and the market share of the largest community (akin
to a one firm concentration ratio). These measures were derived from the community sales
figures discussed above.
Dominant Design Dummy: Following Tushman and Anderson (1986), a dummy variable was
coded one after a single community achieves 50 percent or greater marketshare, zero
otherwise. This measure was derived from the community sales figures discussed above.
Method
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the source of most new designs will be from new entrants
rather than from old sponsors. It will be tested using a simple t-test for difference in means.
The average number of new designs introduced by new entrants per year over the period will
be compared to the average number introduced by former sponsors.
Entry rates of sponsors as well as the rate at which sponsors introduced subsequent
designs were estimated using event count models. In analyzing the entry rates of sponsors,
the population will be the unit of analysis since new sponsors will have no market history
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Thus, the dependent variable will be operationalized as a
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count of the number of sponsors entering each quarter. Two analyses will be performed, one
for communities defined at the level of the design and one for communities defined at the
level of the sponsor.
The distribution used in analyzing the event counts will be the Poisson. The Poisson
model has been used in analyzing event count data as far back as 1898 when von Bortkiewicz
conducted his classic study of accidental death by mule kick in the German army. More
recently, organizational ecologists used this distribution in analyzing founding rates of
organizations (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and Wade,
1991).
In many applications, social event counts display overdispersion, a condition where
the variance of the dependent variable (the event counts) exceeds the mean. In such cases,
using the Poisson model can produce erroneously small standard errors for the estimated
coefficients (Cameron and Trevidi, 1986; Hausman et al., 1984). The problem can be
overcome by assuming a negative binomial distribution of events. Although there is slight
overdispersion in this dataset, it is quite limited. The mean of sponsor entry is .392, while
the variance is .543. For purposes of comparison, in a brewery data set collected by Carroll
and Swaminathan (1991) overdispersion was of much greater severity. In that case the
variance of event counts exceeded the mean by over thirty-two thousand percent, and the use
of the negative binomial specification was clearly appropriate. Because of the only slight
overdispersion here, however, the Poisson was judged to be the appropriate model. I use the
Poisson model as described in the Limdep User's Manual (Greene, 1991).
RESULTS
Organizational Sources of Designs
Hypothesis 1 states that the number of designs introduced by firms that have never
previously introduced an original design would be greater than the number introduced by
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existing sponsors. Table 1 presents the relevant results. Firms in the industry introduced a
total of 38 different designs. All but eight of these were introduced by first-time sponsors.
First-timers introduced significantly more designs per year (p<.05 two tailed test) than
former sponsors. As expected, once a firm introduces a design it tends to remain bound to
it. Notably, of the thirty designs introduced by new sponsors, only three firms had
previously been second sources. Apparently, once a firm becomes a second source, future
innovation (in the sense of introducing a new design) is unlikely.
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
Design Introductions by Former Sponsors
Hypothesis 2 suggests that sponsors in more dominant communities will be more
likely to introduce new designs, not only because they have the resources to invest in new
designs, but also because, as producers of a dominant network of products, they face high
competitive pressure. I measured dominance in two ways. First, the total number of
members in each community was calculated. This number serves as a measure of dominance
because it can be viewed as an information externality indicating a products' status as a
possible industry standard (Swann, 1987). A second measure used was the market share of
products associated with the innovating community. Sales by the sponsor as well as by its
second sources are used in calculating this measure and were only available over the
restricted time period, 1975 to 1989. Because of the small number of events, this analysis
was conducted on a yearly basis rather than a quarterly one.
With respect to this test, defining the community at the level of the design presents a
difficult theoretical problem. For example, when a sponsor introduced its third design, it is
not clear which of the communities based on its earlier designs should be assigned the event.
Because of this problem, this test was conducted only on communities defined at the level of
the sponsor.
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Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. Model 1 shows that sponsors in
communities with a larger share of second source support are more likely to create a new
design (p<.05). However, model 2, shows that a community's market share is not
significant, although it is in the expected positive direction. The time elapsed since a
community introduced a design and the number of designs previously introduced were
included in the models as control variables. Although the time elapsed since the last design
introduction has no effect, the number of designs introduced in the past has a positive impact
on subsequent design introductions.
[Insert Table 2 About Here]
Models 3 and 4 add to the analysis the three innovations made by firms which were
previously second sources. Within each community defined by a sponsor, all members of
more dominant communities might possibly be under a greater pressure to innovate.
However, this measure proved problematic because second sources sometimes belonged to
more than one community. Nonetheless, the community in which the second source had its
greatest amount of sales should have the strongest influence on its decision to innovate.
Thus, a new design produced by a former second source was assumed to emanate from the
community in which the second source had the greatest amount of sales. Models 3 and 4
provide support for these arguments, showing that new designs are more likely to come from
firms in more dominant communities. Although these results support the hypothesis, they
should be considered only suggestive due to the small number of events.
Entry Rates of Sponsors
Table 3 first examines the determinants of the rate of sponsor entry when the
community is defined at the level of the sponsor. Thus, here, a community is composed of a
sponsor of one or more designs and all second sources of those designs. Model 1 shows that
although the number of communities has no effect, the number of second sources negatively
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affects sponsor entry. Consistent with Gallini (1984) and Hypothesis 4, the existence of
increased second source support apparently decreases the probability of firms entering with
new designs. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the effect of the number of
communities on sponsor entry would be curvilinear, in the form of an inverted U-shape.
While both the linear and the squared term are in the expected direction, only the linear term
reaches significance using a two-tailed test. However, since Hypothesis 3 was directional, a
one tailed test is more appropriate; when this test is used, the squared term reaches a
significance level of about .06.
[Insert Table 3 About Here]
Model 3 is similar to model 2, except it adds a dominant design dummy (a variable
that is coded one after a community captures over 50% of the market). In agreement with
Hypothesis 6 but contrary to Hypothesis 5, the emergence of a dominant design spurs entry
by sponsors. Further, in model 3 the linear term of community density remains significant
and the significance of the squared term increases sharply (p<.05). In addition, the
inflection point at which community density switches from increasing to suppressing entry
occurs when there are about 12 communities in the market. This number is well within the
observed range of the data (see Figure 2). Thus, the density dependence model does predict
the rate of sponsor entry once the emergence of a dominant design is controlled for in the
equation.
[Insert Figure 2 About Here]
Model 4 reestimates model 3 using an alternative conceptualization of the relevant
communities. That is, a community is defined at the design level, rather than at the level of
the sponsor in these models. As shown, these models are consistent with the earlier results,
indicating that, at least in this sample, the particular specification of density used is of little
consequence.
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The finding that a dominant design's emergence increases the rate of sponsor entry is
significant and deserves further investigation. This finding contradicts the dominant design
theory, yet it is consistent with resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985). Consistent with
Hypothesis 7, the positive effect of the dominant design term suggests that increasing
concentration in the industry may be a factor. So, using each community's sales, I computed
the Herfindahl index and the market share of the most dominant community to investigate
concentration.
One method of determining if concentration increases the rate of sponsor entry would
be to add it to the overall model. However, this would be an unfair test since the resource
partitioning model applies only when economies of scale are present. Only after scale
economies dominate does the model predict survivors will move toward the center of the
market, leaving pockets of resources of which specialists can take advantage. Scale
economies clearly do not dominate at the beginning of an industry's history. Since the
history of microprocessors is brief, including the entire history could skew the results.
Among other things concentration is often artificially high in a population's early history
when only a few firms occupy the market, rendering any positive findings misleading. For
instance, Intel, the first entrant in the industry, practically owned the market until 1975 and
1976 when a flood of entrants appeared on the scene.
By resource partitioning theory, models using concentration should be tested only
after scale economies become significant. Some theorists have suggested that this occurs
with the advent of a dominant design (Utterback and Suarez, 1991; Anderson and Tushman,
1990). Following Anderson and Tushman (1990), I define the emergence of a dominant
design as occurring when one design captures over 50% of the market. This yields 1984 as
the date when scale economies prevail.
[Insert Table 4 About Here]
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Table 4 analyzes the effects of concentration using as a starting point 1984, the year
when Intel first controlled over 50% of the market. Models 1 and 2 examine the effects of
concentration while controlling for the effects of sales and community density. As expected,
as concentration increases so does the entry rate of new sponsors. The two concentration
measures remain significant (p< .10) even after sales growth is added as a control variable in
models 3 and 4 10 . Possibly, however, models 3 and 4 are misspecified since it is only the
growth of communities other than the one containing the dominant design that would be
expected to influence sponsor entry rates. To investigate this possibility, models 5 and 6 add
the sales growth of nondominant designs into the model. As can be seen, growth in sales of
the nondominant communities has a positive effect on sponsor entry. Importantly, both
measures of concentration remain positive and increase in significance (p< .01). Further,
models 5 and 6 improve significantly on models 1 and 2, while models 3 and 4 do not.
Models 7 and 8 add the sales growth of the dominant community which is not significant.
Models 9 through 16 reestimate models 1 through 8 defining the communities at the level of
the design. As can be seen, the results do not change.
Summary and Limitations
In this study, I viewed competing designs as sources of technological variation. Both
complementary and competing hypotheses were generated using predictions from the
dominant design theory (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Tushman and Anderson, 1986),
organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and the economic literature on standards
(David and Greenstein, 1990). In general, the empirical analysis shows strong support for
the hypotheses, particularly for the ecological predictions.
As expected, most of the variation in the form of new designs came from first-time
sponsors. Apparently, once a firm introduces a design it remains bound to it. In a sense,
the firm gets stuck on a technological trajectory (Sahal, 1985; Dosi, 1982). Of the firms that
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do introduce more than one design, most come from the more dominant communities,
probably because they have both the resources and the motivation to introduce a new design.
Thus, while firms rarely introduce more than one design, those that do originate from
dominant communities.
As postulated, sponsors tend to enter the market following the pattern suggested by
Hannan's (1986) density dependent model of organizational evolution. More specifically, as
the number of communities first increases, the entry rate also increases because of
legitimation processes. However, as density increases still further, competition grows at an
increasing rate and dominates, causing entry rates to fall. Consistent with economic theory
and Hypothesis 4, an increase in the number of second sources suppresses sponsor entry.
Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the emergence of a dominant design increases rather than
decreases the entry rate of sponsors. This finding is consistent, however, with Carroll's
(1985) model of resource partitioning, as shown in the positive effects of concentration in
Table 4. Inspection of the entrants following the emergence of a dominant design suggests
that they were, in some sense, specialists, thus reinforcing the resource partitioning
interpretation. All eleven of new entrants' processors were specialized, serving the segment
of the market in which performance was of the highest priority.
Overall, these analyses have identified some sources and determinants of
technological variation within an industry. However, the findings are limited in several
ways. First, the extent to which these results are generalizable is unknown. The
microprocessor market has been a high growth industry throughout its history. In a low
growth industry with low technological potential, these results might not hold. It would be
useful for future studies to analyze several industries to determine the conditions under which
the processes uncovered here hold or do not hold.
Another limitation of this research is that the number of firms in the market and,
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consequently, the number of entries and analyzable events was relatively small. This
shortcoming was particularly severe when the effects of community dominance were
examined, and statistical inferences were made from fewer than ten events (See Table 2).
Thus, in general, the results in this study should be taken as suggestive, rather than
definitive. Nonetheless, given this caveat, this market was studied in great detail using
numerous sources to insure as robust an analysis as possible. Further, the results were
generally strong and consistent with the hypotheses.
Implications for the Dominant Design Theory
The findings here may have important implications for the dominant design model as
it is currently formulated. Although the dominant design model describes the period of
ferment following a discontinuity as a time of intense competition within and between
technological regimes, it does not identify the underlying process. Since I find here that
most designs are established by new firms, the entry rate of sponsors is probably a good
proxy for the extent of technological variation in the market. Each sponsor essentially
represents a possible technological trajectory and hence variation. Interestingly, the entry
rate of sponsors follows the density-dependent model of organizational evolution posited by
Hannan (1986). At the beginning of the industry, each new community in the population
increases the industry's legitimation. As numbers grow, the capital market increasingly sees
the industry as viable and access is increased to the capital markets. However, as
communities become increasingly prevalent, the industry becomes taken for granted and
competition dominates. Consequently, the entry rate of new sponsors with original designs
falls. The legitimation phase of this process is similar to Anderson and Tushman's (1990)
conception of an era of ferment following a discontinuity in which there is a proliferation of
new designs. However, here I explain the process underlying the phenomenon, while the
dominant design model, thus far, addresses only its consequences. This result also extends
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the density dependent theory of legitimation and competition by linking it to technological
variation.
The finding that increased concentration increases the entry rate of sponsors directly
contradicts the dominant design model. According to the theory, after the emergence of a
dominant design customers and producers rally around it. It is difficult to dislodge the
dominant design because volume production enables producers to achieve economies of scale
and thus creates learning economies due to learning by doing (Utterback and Abernathy,
1975; Arrow, 1962). This logic obviously suggests that technological variation in the form
of new sponsor entry should subsequently decline until the next discontinuity.
The finding that increased concentration increases sponsor entry is, however,
consistent with resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985). As mentioned above, the
emergence of a "dominant" design is associated with increased economies of scale. As these
become important, a dominant community will tend to cater to the center of the market
because it is this segment in which gains from economies of scale can be most fully realized.
On the other hand, in a less concentrated market in which there are many competitors, a
viable strategy would be for each firm to serve a slightly different niche taking up more of
the resource space, making entry as a specialist more problematic. Thus increasing
concentration should open up pockets of resources into which specialists can enter and thrive.
Indeed, this process seems to be occurring here.
Another assumption of the dominant design model is that the timing of technological
discontinuities is random and unpredictable. However, perhaps this is because this literature
offers only a narrow definition of variation, that of technological discontinuities.
Alternatively, increased variation could be thought of as occurring when more new designs
are introduced since each design constitutes a potential technological trajectory for the
industry. Just as authors in the organizational economics literature view patents as inventive
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activity (Pavitt et al., 1987), the introduction of many new designs in the market in a short
period could also be viewed as inventive activity. It follows that under conditions in which
many new designs are entering the market, there is a greater chance of a discontinuity
occurring. Thus, if one only looks at the timing of discontinuities, they may well appear to
be random. However, this is essentially sampling on the dependent variable. A better
approach might be to examine when more inventive activity occurs. I contend that while
discontinuities will not always occur during periods of higher inventive activity, they will be
more likely to occur at that time than during other periods. Since I find that the majority of
new designs are introduced by firms which are new innovators, the entry rates of these
design sponsors may be one measure of inventive activity.
If the entry of sponsors is an indication of inventive activity, the results here shed
some light on when discontinuities are likely to occur. One period in a market's history
when there is likely to be a high entry rate is near the beginning, when each increase in
community density increases the entry rate of sponsors. This process continues until there
are no longer any positive returns in terms of legitimation and competitive forces begin to
dominate. High entry rates are also likely under conditions of high concentration as
opportunities for specialists increase. Interestingly, many of the new sponsors entering after
the emergence of a dominant community utilized a new technology known as Reduced
Instruction Set Code (RISC) to increase their processors' performance. Consistent with
resource partitioning theory, these new entrants were specialists in the sense that their
products were intended for users for whom high performance was critical. Because RISC
technology did result in a large performance improvement, one could argue that its
development was an example of a discontinuous change. Thus, discontinuous technological
change may not be as unpredictable as is generally thought. Predicting when discontinuities
are likely to occur may be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Future research needs to address critically the assumptions of the dominant design
model. As it stands now, it is primarily a descriptive theory which has very little to say
about the processes underlying the phenomenon of technological change. I have shown here
that an alternative set of theoretical models, namely, resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985)
and density dependence (Hannan, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1989) can explain some of the
same phenomena as the dominant design theory. In addition, the very focus on a dominant
design deemphasizes the role of small firms and communities. The ecological approach
taken here underscores the importance of examining all the firms in a community.
Conclusion
This study has illustrated some of the effects that community level dynamics can have
on the technological evolution of markets. However, the inter-organizational relationships
examined here represent only a small part of the relevant linkages. Here, technological
communities were centered around designs or sponsors, with second sources as members.
As Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) point out, relationships with professional associations,
universities, customers, and suppliers of complementary products will surely have an impact
on the evolution of technologies. Examining a broader set of community linkages may be
an interesting avenue for future research.
This study primarily examined the emergence of technological communities. The
processes that govern entry into a particular community, however, remain unexplored.
Organizational ecology may provide a framework for investigating not only dynamics
between communities, but within them. In many markets, the level of organizational support
that a design attracts is likely to influence customers' propensity to invest in the system. A
greater level of organizational support, perhaps in the form of second sources (imitators) and
producers of associated products, makes it less likely that the technological community will
fail and render customers' investments worthless. Thus, investigating how technological
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communities attract organizational support may yield some insight into what factors start
technological bandwagons rolling, or, correspondingly, bring them to a halt.
The general approach taken here may also have implications for the broad literature
on inter-organizational networks. Essentially, the technological communities defined here are
a particular type of network. For instance, in Japan, firms throughout the economy are
linked through ownership, equity and directorship ties. Distinct groups called keiretsu have
developed in the economy (Orru, Hamilton and Suzuki, 1989). Generally, however, these
inter-organizational linkages are investigated statically or over relatively short time periods
(See Gerlach, 1992). Using an ecological approach, one could view each network as a
separate community and investigate dynamic processes within and between them. In short,
examining the competitive dynamics within and between communities defined at a broader
level in this industry and others may be a fruitful area for future research.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A market which is related to microprocessors is that of microcontrollers. Here, I
investigate only microprocessors. Appendix A descibes these two markets in greater detail
and explains why they are separable for research purposes.
2. The primary heuristic used to group products into "compatibility" communities in this
market was hardware and software compatibility. Because of technological progress, new
products by an innovating firm would sometimes lose some compatibility with earlier
products, but if some degree of compatibility remained, it would be assigned to that design
community. For example, while the 8086 is not hardware compatible with many of the
earlier 8085's peripheral devices, it does share a high degree of software compatibility.
Thus, since this product is assumed to build on the architecture of the earlier product, it is
considered to be in the same design group.
3. A problem arises when a firm other than the original sponsor designs a product
compatible in some respects to the original sponsor's products, but which has a unique
architecture that cannot be directly tied to any product in the original design community. It is
suggested here that this sponsorship by another firm is crucial, and that the related product
and its sponsor should be grouped into a separate community. Because two different
sponsors control these products, each architecture may develop in a different direction. In
this case, each sponsor has a large impact on how easily its products can be copied as well as
the future technological direction its products can take. Since the two sponsors are not likely
to always have coinciding interests, a boundary between the two communities is likely to
arise.
It should be stressed that this original design, put forward by another designer, is
more than just an emulation. A firm that produces an emulation of another firm's products
would not be considered to be a sponsor. An emulation is more than a copy, in that it
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generally has some performance advantages over the targeted product. However, it is
generally totally compatible with the earlier product, and for the most part, any differences
are transparent to users. An example in this industry is early products in NEC's V series.
These were emulations of several of Intel's processors which were completely pin and
software compatible although they were of slightly higher performance. On the other hand,
products introduced by another sponsor which share only some compatibility with existing
products, and have a unique mix of features, are not emulations, but would be considered
instead as members of a new design family. For example, while Zilog's Z80 was similar to
Intel's 8080 in that the 8080's instruction set was a subset of the Z80's, it had over 50 more
instructions, and its bus structure was unique. It is argued here that the sponsor of the Z80,
along with its second sources, should be considered members of a separate design
community. Although the Z80 is related to the Intel products, the interdependencies of
second sources would be controlled by Zilog, not Intel.
4. For more details on how these communities were defined, see Appendix B.
5. The OS2 system is still being pushed by IBM. However, by almost any measure
of success, it has been a failure thus far.
6. The data were obtained on the condition that the name of the data research
company be kept confidential.
7. Occasionally EDN stopped tracking the prices of older products. In these cases, the last
price given was assumed to remain constant throughout the rest of the product's life. This
seemed reasonable since, in most cases, the decline in price of these products had leveled off
and would not be expected to decline further.
In several cases, the prices reported by EDN of some older products actually started
to increase after a decline of many years. Some of these older products continued to be
shipped in significant amounts even though the firm had a more advanced product that was
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cheaper. Possibly, former users had previous investments in the older product which would
be lost if they switched. I deemed it unlikely that the microprocessor firm would increase
prices to these established users and face the risk of alienating them. This tactic was
probably employed to encourage new customers to purchase the newer product. Thus, for
purposes of calculating sales, the price of a product was never increased, it was assumed to
remain at the lower price. A marketing specialist at a leading microprocessor firm verified
that this was a reasonable assumption.
8. Only yearly unit sales were available by product in 1975. Quarterly unit sales were
estimated for this year by interpolating backwards using the unit sales of the product in the
first quarter of 1976 as a starting point. A quarterly growth rate was selected so that the
sum of the interpolated quarterly values in 1975 would equal the yearly estimate provided by
the research firm. Four products only had yearly unit shipments recorded throughout their
history. These shipments were equally split within each year.
For four bit and 12 bit unit shipments, the data research firm did not identify the
firms or products. The 12 bit product was determined to be the IM6100 (See Appendix C).
Because there were only two 4 bit processors in the sample and the research firm listed one
of them, the PPS-4 under microcontrollers, these shipments were assigned to the remaining
processor, the Intel 4004.
In a few cases, the date of introduction of the product was determined to be before it
was tracked by the data research firm. When this occurred the unit sales were interpolated
back to the starting date using the growth rate of the product during the first year that it was
tracked by the research firm. In rare cases where these dates differed by over three years,
the data was assumed to be missing.
In general, it is unlikely that changes in these assumptions would have any' effect on
the calculated sales values. Typically the interpolated values represented less than one
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percent of the total shipments.
9. One of the communities that was missing unit sales data was Rockwell's which included
the PPS-4. Consistent unit sales were not available because the research firm pooled sales
data from the microprocessor version of the PPS-4 with the microcontroller version. Thus,
unit sales were assumed to be missing and Rockwell was assigned its share of the remaining
1.25% of sales. Because various sources report that the PPS-4 was a high volume product,
this probably underestimates its sales. However, because sales figures for all communities
were so low during this time (the PPS-4 exited the sample in 1976) compared to later
periods, this assumption is not likely to affect the results.
10. Because of interpolations, quarterly sales growth was not available before 1976 and
could not be added to the models in Table 3. However, in a model run over the restricted
time period, 1976 to 1989, sales growth had no effect.
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF NEW DESIGNS INTRODUCED:
BY ORGANIZATIONAL SOURCE
ORGANIZATIONAL
SOURCE
TOTAL DESIGNS
INTRODUCED
MEAN OF ANNUAL T TEST OF DIFFERENCE
DESIGNS STANDARD IN MEANS BY
PER YEAR DEVIATION ORGANIZATIONAL SOURCE
1 . All Sources 38
New Sponsors 30
Former Sponsors 8
2. All Sources 38
Firms New to the Industry 27
All Others 11
3. New Sponsors Only 30
Firms New to the Industry 27
Former Second Sources 3
1.58
.421
1.42
.579
1.42
.158
2.17
.607
2.01
.838
2.01
.501
-2.24*
1.69"
-2. 66"
*p< .10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
TABLE 2: POISSON REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY DOMINANCE ON
THE RATE OF NEW DESIGN INTRODUCTIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE NEW DESIGNS BY
FORMER SPONSORS
NEW DESIGNS BY FORMER SPONSORS
AND SECOND SOURCES
MODEL
Dominance Measures
Number in Community/ 5.17*"
Total Number in Market (1.64)
Sales in Community/ 2.51
Sales in Market (1.74)
Other Indeoendent Variables
Time Since Last Design .118 .0758
Introduction (.130) (-131)
Number of Designs .906** .767*
Introduced (.396) (.449)
Constant -5.37*-* -4.82**'
(1.15) (1.02)
-2 x Log Likelihood 51.6 47.8
Number of Events 7 6
N 228 216
5.47
—
(1-58)
3.47*'
(1-63)
.146 .117
(.1231 (.123)
1.09— .733—
(.301) (.372)
-5.50— -4.93***
(1.14) (1.01)
61.1 56.5
10 9
228 218
*p< .10 **p<.05 ***p<.01
TABLE 3: POISSON REGRESSION MODELS OF SPONSOR ENTRY - 1971 to 1989 (by quarter)
Independent
Variables'1
1 2
Models
3 4 5 6
Number of Sponsor
.0873 .348** .503*"
Communities (.0619) (.176) (.180)
Number of Sponsor
Communities2
-.0159
(.00995)
-.0207**
(.0995)
Second Sources Supporting
Sponsor Communities
-.0756"
(.0328)
-.0741"
(.0326)
-.156—
(.048)
Dominant Design Dummy 3 22***
(1.11)
2.82**
0.27)
Microprocessor Sales Index .196 .594"
.282 .240 1.05***
.513
(•159) (•279) (.304) (.160) (.301) (.383)
Number of Design
Communities
.0549
(.0602)
.577*"
(.185)
.540***
(.186)
Number of Design
Communities1
-.285***
(.0932)
-.0210**
(.00950)
Second Sources Supporting
Design Communities
-.0647*
(.0349)
-.0323
(.0341)
-.134"
(.0557)
Constant
-.926**
(.455)
-1.57"
(.700)
-1.98***
(.709)
-.800*
(.468)
-2.45***
(.830)
-2.45*"
(.845)
-2 x Log Likelihood 106.3 103.8 92.5 121.3 111.28 91.1
Number of Events 29 29 29 29 29 29
N 74 74 74 74 74 74
"*p<.01 "p < .05 *p < .10
b Standard errors are in parentheses.
BLE 4: POISSON REGRESSION MODELS OF PRIMARY SOURCE (SPONSOR) ENTRY AFTER JANUARY 1984
:pendent
tables*
•(umber of Communities
larket Share of
>ommant Community
(erfmdahl Index of
larket Shares
Iicroprocessor Sales Index
licroprocessor Sales Growth
iles Growth of Nondominant
immunities
les Growth of Dominant
)mmunity
x Log Likelihood
mber of Events
COMMUNITY DEFINED AT SPONSOR LEVEL12 3 4
-.0643
(.395)
-.117
(.394)
-.00787
(.416)
-.0593
(.421)
-.453
(-521)
-.550
(.530)
-.397
(.566)
-.485
(.582)
18.0**
(7.49)
14.2*
(7.89)
24.1***
(8.97)
22.70**
(10.5)
17.1**
(6.87)
12.92*
(7-25)
22 ~> i»**
(7.89)
20.7**
(9.68)
.0179
(.534)
-.00854
(-525)
-.189
(.590)
3.09
(2.43)
-.172
(.577)
3.10
(2.43)
.174
(.619)
.211
(.609)
.104
(.684)
.140
(.669)
5.49*
(3.01)
5.37*
(2.96)
5.36*
(3.10)
.451
(.187)
5.23*
(3.06)
.474
(1.87)
-11.23
(8.06)
-6.53
(6.85)
-9.60
(8.10)
-5.55
(6.93)
-9.07
(8.77)
-2.14
(7.80)
-9.87
(8.79)
-2.48
(7.92)
36.0 36.1 34.1 34.3 32.1 32.3 32.0 32.2
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
.10 p < .05 ***p<.01
idard Errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 4 Continued: POISSON REGRESSION MODELS OF PRIMARY SOURCE (SPONSOR) ENTRY AFTER JANUARY 1984
Independent
Variables'1
COMMUNITY DEFINED AT DESIGN LEVEL
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Number of Communities
Market Share of
Dominant Community
Herfindahl Index of
Market Shares
Microprocessor Sales Index
Microprocessor Sales Growth
Sales Growth of Nondominant
Communities
Sales Growth of Dominant
Community
Constant
-2 x Log Likelihood
Number of Events
N
-.319 -.370 -.307 -.346
-.679
(.424) (.431) (.439) (-445) (-517)
17.0** 13.2* 23.4***
(7.30)
16.3"
(6.68)
(7.79)
12.25*
(7.14)
(9.00)
.421 -.424 -.271 .283 .636
(-672) (.676) (-709)
2.94
a-33)
(.710)
2.91
(2.34)
(-765)
5.57**
(2.90)
-6.32
-1.81 -4.03 -.393
-4.22
(8.84) (7.87) (9.22) (8.12) (9.46)
35.4 35.3 33.6 33.6 31.0
11 11 11 11 11
23 23 23 23 23
-.791
-.657
(.545) (.599)
22.8**
(10.9)
21.46***
(7.80)
.730 .604
(.787) (-831)
21.11
(10.0)
5.42* 5.52* 5.3
(2.85) (2.97)
.188
(2.9
.1
(1.90) (1.9
-3.03 -4.20 2.9
(8.81) (9.49) (8.9
31.1 31.0 30.5
11 11 11
23 23 23
p < .10 ** p < .05 *-*p<.01
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
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APPENDIX A: Contrasts Between the Microprocessor and Microcontroller Markets
Below I describe the microprocessor and microcontroller markets and then clarify
why it is appropriate to study the microprocessor market independently.
A microcontroller is a "stand alone" system. It generally has a fixed instruction set
that is used to create a program permanently burned into the read only memory (ROM)
before being shipped to the customer. Microcontrollers are usually purchased in large
quantities. For instance, a microcontroller might be used when a manufacturer needs a
device solely to monitor oil pressure in an automobile. On a continuum, microcontrollers
are one step up from a dedicated logic chip in terms of flexibility. They are best suited for
use in specialized but fixed tasks.
Microprocessors are general purpose devices. They perform both the primary
execution and control functions in a system. Microprocessors, which resemble and often are
the CPU in a computer, require peripheral products, such as memory and input-output
devices to create a working system. In combination with peripheral devices, a
microprocessor allows communication with the outside world and other systems.
Consequently, microprocessors are much more flexible than microcontrollers, allowing a user
to modify and expand the system when a change occurs in the application.
Despite the relatedness of the two products, microprocessors have experienced the
most technological change. For example, while there are many 32 bit microprocessors, there
are few, if any, 32 bit microcontrollers. In addition, although there was some speculation
during the industry's early development that the more cost efficient microcontrollers would
displace and become substitutes for the older eight bit microprocessors, this change has not
occurred. If anything, some older microprocessors have displaced some of the
microcontrollers, because as the older microprocessors' prices fell, they became the preferred
alternative because of their flexibility. It should be noted, however, that for a specialized
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task which requires only minimal communication with peripheral devices and the outside
world, a microcontroller is the preferred and more cost efficient alternative.
The existence of these two products and their associated markets poses a difficult
research problem. That is, should the microcontroller be pooled with the microprocessor
market (which is of greatest interest) or should the microprocessor market be analyzed
separately? The advantage of pooling the markets is chiefly one of increased statistical
power because of the greater number of observations. However, such pooling could produce
erroneous and misleading results if most of the competitive effects that affected
microprocessors came from other microprocessors rather than from microcontrollers. This
research design decision would be particularly critical when predicting the introduction rate
of new microprocessor designs.
Because the locus of technological change has been in the microprocessor market, I
take the more conservative approach and analyze only microprocessors. If there is any
interaction between these markets, the microprocessor segment is likely to be primary
because of its technologically dominant position. Further, the contention that these products
are different --and thus separable for research purposes- markets is reinforced by social
convention. As early as 1976, IC Master, a book which engineers use to select processors
based on performance characteristics, made a distinction between the two products. In
addition, DataQuest, the leading market research firm in the industry publishes separate
reports for microprocessors and microcontrollers. When describing microcomponents, within
which microcontrollers and microprocessors are two separate market catagories DataQuest
(1989, p. 1) submits that, "each product catagory is quite distinct from the others in terms of
functionality, performance and end application." The distinctions between the two products
also extend to the structure of organizations that produce microcontrollers and the
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professional activities of engineers in them. A senior market analyst in a leading
semiconductor firm who I interviewed noted that,
"while most firms that produce microprocessors also sell microcontrollers, the strategies
undertaken in the two markets are completely different. Microcontrollers are high volume,
low margin products which are marketed like commodities. Microprocessors, on the other
hand, are sold at much higher margins and require close customer relationships.
Consequently, a firm's microprocessor products are always organized in a completely
different division from microcontrollers, with minimal interaction between them. This lack
of interaction even extends to professional conferences in which engineers in the two groups
go to completely different conferences."
Because of these differences, it seems clear that the two markets are distinct, and that the
best course of action is to analyze the microprocessor market in isolation.
Occasionally, the line between microprocessors and microprocessors was blurred.
However, generally these cases were relatively rare and were resolved by consulting
numerous sources in combination with the judgement of the author. One problematic case,
however, was Rockwell's PPS-4 and PPS-8, two processors that were within the same
design family. When these processors were first introduced, they were microprocessors.
However, by 1976 Rockwell had introduced one or two chip versions of these
microprocessors that were considered by most data sources to be microcontrollers. Over
time, both the microprocessor versions began to be perceived as competing in the
microcontroller market. For instance, the Microprocessor Data Manual published in 1978,
classified all versions of the PPS-4 and PPS-8 as all in one processors, most suitable for
microcontroller applications. No other chips that I identified as microprocessors were
included in this list.
This perception probably occurred because by 1975, the PPS-4's primary sales base
was composed of about a dozen high-volume customers. Since this type of sales base is most
effectively serviced by microcontrollers, the introduction of microcontroller versions of the
PPS-4 and PPS-8 probably made the microprocessor versions obsolete. Because these
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microprocessors became associated with the microcontroller market and the fact that the
introduction of the microcontroller versions probably made them obsolete, processors
comprising this design family were assumed to exit the microprocessor market upon the
introduction of the microcontroller versions in the second quarter of 1976.
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APPENDIX B: Definition of a Community
Throughout the analyses, I define communities both at the level of the design and of
the sponsor. A sponsor is defined as the organization that has a proprietary interest in a
design or series of designs. A design is composed of the family of products that are tied
together by software or hardware compatibility to a common sponsor.
To group products into designs, the following procedure was used:
Step 1:
"Does the new product share some hardware or software compatibility with existing
products?"
If not, the products are determined to be in different design groups.
If the answer is yes, go to step two.
Step 2:
"Is the sponsor of the product also the designer of the products with which it shares some
degree of hardware or software compatibility?"
If the answer is yes, the products are determined to be in the same design group.
If the answer is no, go to step three.
Step 3:
"Does the product have additional unique features which make it not completely hardware or
software incompatible with the other product?"
If the answer is yes, the second product is a new design.
The reasoning behind step 3 is that the technological trajectories of two products
(designs) which are only partially compatible and have different capabilities or features are
likely to diverge over time simply because they have two independent sponsors (Arthur,
1989). Two notable exceptions were made to these rules. First, although the scalable
processor architecture (SPARC) developed by Sun Microsystems does not require producers
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to be hardware compatible, it requires complete software compatibility and sets forward the
manner in which the RISC architecture and performance requirements should be
implemented. Since all of these rules were conceived of by a central source, namely Sun
Microsystems Inc., all SPARC devices were considered to be a common design. The other
exception was made for the Digital Equipment Company's MN601/02 and the Fairchild
9440/45 processors. Although these lacked hardware compatibility, both were direct
emulations of Digital Equipment's NOVA series minicomputers. Because of this similarity,
Fairchild was involved in an extensive patent infringement suit with Digital for over three
years. Thus, these processors were classified as being in the same design group.
After designs were identified, communities were constructed at two different levels.
In the first, communities were defined at the level of the design. Each community consisted
of the sponsor of the design and second sources of that design. By this formulation,
members of a community were bound together by their product's software and hardware
compatibility and by a common sponsor. In the second approach used, communities were
constructed at the level of the sponsor. In this formulation, the community consisted of the
sponsor of one or more designs and those second sources who copied them. Members of this
type of community were bound together by the existence of a common sponsor of one or
more designs.
One reason that I defined communities in two separate ways is because of difficulties
in applying ideas from the literature on standards. Unfortunately, most of this literature
implicitly assumes that a sponsor will have a proprietary interest in only one design. The
mixed case in which a sponsor may be the originator of several incompatible designs is never
considered.
From the sociological perspective taken here, a community defined at the level of the
sponsor is the most relevant level of analysis. Customers and employees of a particular
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sponsor are likely to develop general relationships and interdependencies with the sponsor
that transcend issues of product compatibility. Moreover, the fates of designs which
originate from the same sponsor are not likely to be independent. In short, embeddedness
(Granovetter, 1985) considerations are likely to apply.
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APPENDIX C: Rules For Calculating Entry and Exit Dates
Exit and Entry Dates for Sponsors
Exit and entry dates for sponsors were obtained from several sources; the two
primary sources were IC Master and shipment data from the market research firm. Entry
and exit dates were first calculated for each firm separately using the two sources. Because
the market research firm reported actual shipments, it was considered the most accurate.
Therefore, the second event dataset was simply constructed to catch any gross errors and to
add any firms that the first dataset did not include. For the market research firm, entry and
exit events were computed on a quarterly basis. Before 1982, IC Master reported quarterly
shipment dates; after 1982 there was only yearly data. Quarterly shipment dates were used
when available. When only yearly dates were available, sponsors were assumed to enter
during the year before their last listing and to exit during the year of their last listing. IC
Master was published each January or February, so this strategy is reasonable. I used the
following rules to calculate final entry and exit dates for sponsors:
1) If a firm was listed only by the market research firm, those dates were used for entry and
exit.
2) If a firm was listed by both sources (the most frequent occurrence) and the dates differed
by no more than a year, the research firm's date was used.
3) If firms were listed by both sources and the dates differed by more than a year, EDNs
Annual reports on Microprocessors were consulted. If no information was found here, the
other subsidiary sources named above were investigated. These sources were used to decide
which of the two dates was most likely to be correct. If no evidence was found indicating
that either date was correct, the research firm's date was used.
4) If a firm was only listed by IC Master, additional sources (above) were used to see if
there was any evidence that the firm never shipped the device or that the true date of
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shipment differed by more than a year. If no such evidence was found, the IC Master date
was used.
Usually, entry and exit dates were calculated to the quarter. In the few cases where
only a yearly entry or exit date was available, the event was randomly assigned to a quarter
during the year. For the 30 communities defined at the level of the sponsor, three entry
dates and seven exit dates could only be determined to the nearest year and were randomly
assigned to quarters within the year.
Exit and Entry Dates for Second Sources
A similar procedure was used for identifying entry and exit dates for second sources.
However, EDWs survey was less helpful because it often listed only those firms licensed to
produce. Unfortunately, having a license does not mean that one is producing. Thus, the
secondary sources were also relied upon to adjudicate any conflicting dates between the two
primary sources.
Despite consulting both primary and secondary sources, obtaining the "true" date of
entry of California Micro devices was problematic. Consequently, a firm representative was
contacted. She was able to provide the firm's date of entry (to the nearest year) and the
dates at which subsequent products were introduced.
It was also difficult to determine from existing sources an accurate date for when
Harris ceased production of Intersil's 12 bit IM6100 design. One problem was due to the
fact that while the research firm listed units shipped for 12 bit designs, it did not identify the
firms involved. However, since other sources quoted these 12 bit totals as the number of
units of the IM6100 that was shipped, it was deduced that the IM6100 was the design that the
research firm was tracking. Further, since Harris and Intersil were the only sources of this
design and were included in the research firm's database for other microprocessors, the totals
given probably reflected combined units shipped by both firms.
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According to the research firm, shipping of the IM6100 ceased during 1985. This
date agreed with IC Master's date of exit for Intersil. Since the research firm pooled Harris
and Intersil shipments, this suggested that Harris ceased shipping in 1985 or earlier.
However, according to IC Master, Harris shipped the IM6100 until 1989. Because of this
large discrepancy, a representative of Harris was contacted. Although this representative
could not determine the date at which shipments were ended, she indicated that the 1989 IC
Master date was definitely incorrect and that shipments were stopped much earlier.
Consequently, it was assumed that Harris stopped shipping the IM6100 during 1985, the
same year as Intersil. Essentially, it was assumed that the second source would follow the
lead of the sponsor and stop shipments at approximately the same time.
As noted earlier, firms could appear as second sources for more than one
community. Consequently, once a firm appeared in the research firm's database, its future
dates for second sourcing were assumed to be correct. The logic here was that once a firm
enters the research firm's database, future entry dates for that firm are likely to be accurate.
For the 53 second sources in communities defined at the level of the sponsor, four ending
dates and six starting dates were randomly assigned to quarters within the year.
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